THE EGYPTIAN DIASPORA IN MILAN: GENERATIONAL, GENDERED, AND RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF AGING

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This report is the final output of the research carried out in the frame of the project *The Aging African Diaspora: Perspectives from Lombardia* (TAAD, funded by Cariplo Foundation): fieldwork spanned between February 2019 and October 2021 and focussed on notions of aging and well-being within the Egyptian community in Milan. Quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews with were carried out with roughly 160 Egyptian Nationals residing in Lombardia, Milan’s region, and with the members of some associations such as ASGI – *Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione* (Association for the Juridical Studies on Immigration)1, *Casa della Cultura Musulmana* (House of Muslim Culture)2, and *Giovani per il Bene* (Youth for Good, or in Arabic: شباب الجيير shabāb al-khayr)3. At first glance, Egyptians in Milan may appear to lack visibility in the city, because they do not dwell in a precise geographical place (contrary to, for example, Chinatown) and because they are divided by socio-cultural, economic, and religious differences. One of the main dividing lines is the period of immigration into the country, which separates those who came before 2000 and those who migrated after that date. The post-2000 generation appears to be characterized by the tendency to fall in and out of the job market and thus of the legal permission to stay in the country. Moreover, the younger members of the community are surrounded by a more hostile and Islamophobic environment after 9/11. Due to this internal stratification, the community shows different stances vis à vis aging processes and practices of care targeting elderly people. This report illustrates the multifaceted meanings attached to the notion of aging, country, house, return, and future, and how coordinates such as generation, class, gender, and religion (Muslim/Copts) articulate with such concepts. Strictly interwoven to the experience of aging, the practices of care towards elderly people have undergone various transformations recently. In the course of 2020, the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has impacted greatly on the community due to its labour-related characteristics. While dealing with the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and the subsequent measures of lockdown and containment of the virus, the Egyptian community’s attitudes towards the welfare state and the domestic sphere of care changed. The effects of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic in Italy have been analysed on the general psychological and social level (Sironi and Riva 2020) and also with regard to the political consequences of the government’s security decisions (Raffaetà 2020)4, but little anthropological attention has been focused on the impact of the emergency situation on migrants’ communities. Since the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic outbreak, some online blogs have reported on the solidarity strategies put in place within migrants’ networks (Ficarelli 2020; Scaglioni 2020). Little, however, has been said about how the pandemic is changing gender and care relations within households, even though care became a highly debated issue during the outbreak of the pandemic5. Egyptian women tend to have a low level of employment: 80% of Egyptian women in Italy does not work (CARITAS E MIGRANTES 2020: 59). When faced with the new emergency situation, they demonstrated high degrees of initiative and committed to charity activities to relieve the economic problems of Milan population during the protracted lockdowns, shifting care from the private sphere of the house to the public space. Adopting a gendered lens in inquiring the care practices of a charity association, *Giovani per il Bene* (Youth for Good, or in Arabic: شباب الجيير shabāb al-khayr), this report tries to unpack how gender ideologies and homemaking processes have changed within the households of those who are involved in the association, and how the pandemic has modified the representations of old age and aging.

**Methodology**

The research started with the classic tool-kit of ethnography: participant observation and semi-structured interviews, but as the seriousness of the health crisis due to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic in

1 https://www.asgi.it/
3 https://www.facebook.com/GiovaniXilBene.
4 See also the debate raised by Giorgio Agamben (2020).
February 2020 became clear, the Italian government took strict measures to contain the spread of the virus and face-to-face interactions became more difficult. On January 31st 2020 the Council of Ministers declared a state of emergency, followed by a ban on travellers entering the country and the progressive establishment of “red zones” which culminated in a national lockdown, meaning the shutdown of all unnecessary activities, restrictions on movements and on gatherings. At the beginning of May 2020, following the decrease in the rate of infections, the government eased the restrictions, but safety measures and general advice on how to avoid viral transmission remained in place. Justified by the extremely high death toll, social relations were considerably limited. This required social scientists to avoid in-person fieldwork, developing new methods of data gathering, such as mediated forms and online interactions (Lupton 2020). The methodological tools for this research were refined to cope with such an unprecedented and unpredictable event. Participant observation was mostly employed during the pre-SARS-CoV-2 period, but after February 2020 our methodology expanded to include telephone interviews and online survey research tools (mainly online questionnaires). These new forms of data collection necessarily have some limits, as the pool of interlocutors is restricted to digitally educated, middle class subjects, but also some potentialities, as we reached a high number of individuals in a very short time. The limits were counterbalanced by face-to-face interactions in multifaceted “contact zones” (Pratt 1986), such as mosques, Coptic churches, and cafés, that is places which are attended for a variety of purposes, such as humanitarian, social, religious, leisure, and political activities. Older members of the Egyptian community were not easily accessible by phone but were approached by the research group through the pre-lockdown attendance at the mosque in the South-Eastern district of Corvetto, in via Padova, and in several Egyptian/Arab cafés.

6 All information is taken from the Civil Protection Department website: http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/documents/20182/1227694/Summary+of+measures+taken+against+the+spread+of+C-19/c16459ad-4e52-4e90-90f3-c6a2b-30c17eb.
7 https://www.tuttitalia.it/lombardia/provincia-di-milano/statistiche/cittadini-stranieri/egitto/.
9 https://www.milanoattraverso.it/ma-comunità/4/comunità%C3%A0-egiziana-di-milano/.

THE EGYPTIAN DIASPORA IN MILAN

The Egyptian community in Milan is one of the most numerous and oldest migrant groups in the city.

The Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT) calculated around 141,000 Egyptians living legally in Italy in 2020, making it the eight community of legally residing migrants nation-wide by size (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2020: 13). In 2020, 81% Egyptians resided in the north, and around 66.7% of the total population was in Lombardia (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2020: 15). In 2019, ISTAT recorded 92,521 Egyptian Nationals in the region and 63,205 in the district of Milan, including the city. Egyptians make up the second most numerous foreign community in Milan (14.7%) after the Filipinos. The community is highly gendered: 66.8% are men (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2020: 6).

The community is very diverse, with different levels of integration, in both economic and social terms, and all these factors deeply influence their later life trajectories. Egyptians in Milan make up a diasporic community, that is a network of isolated groups which share cultural consciousness, mode of cultural production, and idioms (see, among others, Vertovec 1997; Brubaker 2005), and lack homogeneity and fluidity.

The presence of Egyptians in Italy dates back to the 1970s, when migration to Italy started in an episodic fashion, following the bilateral agreements signed between the two countries in 1972. In that period, the Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat (1970–1981) inaugurated an “expansive
policy” (1974-1984) (Coslovi and Zarro 2008: 17), encouraging permanent\(^ {10}\) emigration to Western countries. In 1973, Sadat started the infitah policy, which “means opening up [also literally] the Egyptian economy for direct private investment, both Arab and foreign” (Abdel-Khalek 1981: 395), shifting international alignment from the Soviet Union to the Western Union, and adopting a neoliberal political and economic paradigm. This had repercussions on migration: Sadat suspended the exit visa in 1974 (Coslovi and Zarro 2008: 18).

The “first wave” of Egyptians in Italy is characterized by a high social and educational level, a male composition, and an urban background. Some were political dissidents who could not access humanitarian protection because at that time, Italian law granted asylum only with geographical reservations, de facto limiting it to Soviet citizens (Colucci 2018: 22). Therefore, the first wave arrived with a tourist or student visa. For them, Italy was the first choice, and the migrants were both Muslims and Copts. Most of them found a job without the need to resort to pre-migratory networks.

“We come from Cairo. I arrived in April 1977. In Italy because I had a friend and because I liked art, literature, I wanted to see Michelangelo’s masterpieces. Then to work and find a job here. When I arrived, I started from some Egyptians [sic], some restaurants to work as a dishwasher. I was looking for foreigners. There were few foreigners, few Egyptians”\(^ {11}\).

Many Egyptians started working as dishwashers, gradually pursuing careers in the restaurant business and ending up owning their own pizzerias and bakeries. These careers, starting from the bottom, with the acquisition of specific skills on the job, together with a marked entrepreneurial inclination, can be identified as the core characteristics of Egyptians in Milan (Ambrosini and Abbatecola 2004: 359). The “first wave” Egyptians integrated well and show a high percentage of mixed marriages.

“I came, I looked for jobs, I looked for jobs, I worked in a gas station […] then I bought the gas station. One thing and another I opened two restaurants, I opened the bakery. I was [a] born entrepreneur, my father bestowed something upon me. I have a factory producing Plexiglass, plastic stuff. I resell. Now I have a factory, a bakery, and a bar. I have two kids and a Pomerian. With a Moldavian woman. She used to work here behind the counter”\(^ {12}\).

Egyptians’ immigration to Italy reached its peak in the 1990s, when a decrease in the demand for unqualified manpower reduced the Egyptian presence in Arab countries (Coslovi and Zarro 2008: 20). Also, from the 1990s onwards, Egyptian women started joining their spouses or migrating with them (Ambrosini and Abbatecola 2004: 358), and the trend towards the feminisation of migration has gradually increased since then. In legal terms, law Foschi (1986) recognized for the first time the right to family reunification\(^ {13}\).

“I have been here for 12 years. In Egypt I was an entrepreneur, and I had my family business, inherited from my father. I ran it. Then, my husband decided to come back to Italy and be there forever, full-time [he was coming and going, had a small cleaning business]. I had to change place, I had to go with him. I did not know Italian, it took me almost three years, then I did a lot of courses, to find a job. Accountant, safety in the workplace...
until I managed to get into a cultural mediator course. After that, I found a job** 14.

In 1990, the Martelli’s Law (39/1990) shyly attempted the first workers’ quotas planning, and inaugurated the “formative phase” of Italian immigration legislation (Piro 2020: 246). In the same period, similarly to many other European countries, Italy experienced an increase in “irregular” immigration and migrants’ presence, which also impacted on the Egyptian community. From 2000 onwards, exacerbated by the Bossi-Fini Law in 2001 and by the 2008 economic crisis, the life and work conditions of immigrants in Italy became increasingly precarious, falling in and out of the job market and of the legal permission to reside in the country (Colucci 2018: 142). Currently, Italian legislation tends to foster illegality rather than fighting it, and regularly resorts to the sanatoria, a belated regularization of illegal migrants who are particularly sought after in some professional sectors (among others, the healthcare sector). The impossibility of getting “regularized” for migrants who arrived without a permit or who lost their jobs while in Italy is one the most recurrent complains emerging from the interviews. Mohammed is the imam at the mosque at via Padova, he comes from Jordan and deals with a predominantly Egyptian Muslim community.

“We used to help those who arrived with the documents at the police stations. Now there are no sanatoria [plural of sanatoria], many illegal presences, we don’t know how to regularize them. To the State’s eyes, in front of the law, they are nobody. If we want to talk about safety (sicurezza), then we have to talk** 15. With these provisions they create more tension and less safety”** 16.

The “second generation” Egyptians started migrating in the 1990s with a new system of recruitment in the home country, often together with their families. The composition of this group is more heterogenous, including also lower educational and socio-economic levels and rural origins. They are often employed in low-skilled jobs, such as construction workers (especially plasterers), unloading goods at the Central Market in Milan, and cleaners. Recently immigrated Egyptians tend to arrive with their wives or marry fellow country women from their previous social or familiar networks. Nowadays, the Egyptian diaspora in Italy is strongly gendered: with only 33.2% women in 2020 (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2020), migration from Egypt to Italy is still a “male business”.

To an external eye, in fact, they appear as “silent and little visible” (Ambrosini and Abbattecola 2004: 247): few would quote them as the second most numerous foreign community in Milan, as they do not make up a tight-knit community. They do not dwell in a precise geographical area in Milan (contrary to, for instance, Chinatown** 17) and are not connected to some specific professional domains, even if they are in fact specialized in some job sectors. Responding to an in-person survey in Sesto San Giovanni (district of Milan) in February 2019, 9 Italian Nationals out of 10 indicated the Egyptian community as fourth or below amidst the most present communities in Milan, even if they are the second most numerous migrants’ community. The perception of them as “fewer” is strictly interwoven with their invisibility to Italians’ eyes. The answers, in fact, differed for Foreigners, who tended to indicate them as first, second, or third community in Milan by size** 18.

As already mentioned, Egyptian migrants in Italy often looked for employment in restaurants and bakeries. They soon showed a highly entrepreneurial attitude and opened their own businesses, which fall into the category of “open” enterprises, that is activities that do not refer to the foreign origin of their owners, or that do not target foreigners per se (Ambrosini and Boccagni 2004: 41). Egyptians entered one the most Italian sectors, that of pizzerias. In 2016, the Chamber of Commerce in Milan estimated that 50% of individually-owned pizzerias in the city** 19 were owned by migrants, 66% of whom were born in Egypt** 20.

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14 Layla, 50 years old, female, Muslim (May 2020).
15 He refers here to decreto sicurezza (decreto-legge 4 Ottobre 2018, n. 113), “safety decree”, a highly debated provision by the then Ministry of Interior, Matteo Salvini, which aggravated the precariousness and illegality of the migrants’ population in Italy, and which was issued in 2018 and later modified in 2020.
16 Mohammed Asfa, imam at the mosque in via Padova (April 2019).
17 Chinatown revolves around the street Paolo Sarpi in the Northern part of Milan.
18 The survey targeted fifty persons, sixteen of whom were foreigners (February 2019).
19 Meaning that the data do not include international and national chains.
20 https://www.milomb.camcom.it/documents/10157/29535756/pizzerie-italia-2016.pdf/5db1e018-0de9-45dc-bff2-
TRAJECTORIES OF AGING WITHIN THE EGYPTIAN DIASPORA IN MILAN

At the crossroad between aging and migration, the research under the frame of TAAD aimed to inquire how the migratory experience impacted on the aging processes of the Egyptian migrants in Milan, and how migrants actually age, in a society which perceives them as inherently young and able to work. Aging within migration is a relatively new and innovative field of study, since, for long, aging has been represented as a phenomenon exclusive to the Western world, even though aging processes have been consistently involving other continents in the last decades (Sivaramakrishnan 2018; He and Kinsella 2020). Within the Egyptian community, factors such as ethnicity, citizenship, class, and gender concur in the reproduction of inequalities which reverberate onto the wellbeing at an old age. Precarious professional trajectories, together with an unstable legal status in the country, impact heavily on the retirement period and consequently on the subject’s access to health care and welfare. Alongside the problems experienced by those who lose their jobs at a late age and drop out of the job market, a heartfelt issue for Egyptian migrants involves the “silent social security contributions”, that is

“those [migrants] who leave and do not apply for the retirement money. On the legal level there should not be any problems, they apply in Egypt. On the practical level, however, there may be some difficulties while collecting the documents. Those who leave their contributions, those who leave, those who do not do anything. They are what Boeri [former President of INPS (Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale), the National Institute for Social Security] always talk about, the “silent contributions”21.

Social class and citizenship are thus the most important vectors of accumulation of inequalities within the Egyptian diaspora.

Already in the 1980s, anthropological attention has turned to the iniquities in the distribution of welfare to elderly people along the axes of ethnicity and class, and alongside, migration has been incorporated by a more recent literature (Estes and Binney 1989; Estes 1993). Contrary to the neoliberal idea that successful aging is the by-product of sole medicine and individual efforts, the reflection on aging within migration shifts the focus to how the migratory outcomes are able to deeply influence the status of the elderly, whether “successful” or not. Moreover, “success” coincides with Western neoliberal conceptions, and cross-cultural analysis has contributed to the deconstruction of many pervasive ideas about ageing, for example the chronological conception of age (Scaglioni and Diodati 2021: 16). The period of immigration into the country is for Egyptian migrants a fundamental factor in determining the wellbeing of elderly migrants. The “first generation”, which arrived in the 1970s/1980s and is now spending the old age – and in many cases retirement – in Italy, responds more positively to the question whether they feel “successful” at an old age. In their discourses, the “second generation” is less integrated, and thus “less successful”, due to their social and educational background in Egypt.

“These are those who are not used to wear shirt and trousers. They wear a galābiyya [loose-fitting tunic widely used in the Egyptian countryside]”22.

However, they do not seem to acknowledge the general difficulties experienced by migrants in Italy after the tightening of the legislation on migration, which is on the other side well-known to the imams:

“from Morocco is different, because there school is not mandatory. But from Egypt, most of them have an educational background, some have a university degree. With today’s spirit, with the fear that

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21 Alberto Guariso, lawyer of ASGI (Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione - Association for the Juridical Studies on Immigration) (December 2019).
22 Ibrahim, male, Copt (January 2020).
spreads...people do not integrate, it's not the new generations’ [educational] level”23.

“they come and go. When Morsi24 was elected [in 2012] many went back. Surely there will be an improvement! One year after, everybody was here again. Who can flee [Egypt], flees. Who comes here for two or three years, always wants to come back. Then he sees the situation there and doesn’t want to come back any longer. But they want to return”25.

As “transnational families” (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1995), Egyptians see their presence as scattered across different countries. Their presence is inevitably linked to ideas about “returning”. The myth of return has been analysed in academic literature since the seminal work by Muhammad Anwar (1979) on Britain’s Pakistani population. Stuck between two countries, immigrants are often “motivated by the idea of return” (Cekmak 2021), even if this rarely happens in practice. In Milan, ideas on return differ greatly between the “first” and “second generation” Egyptian migrants, but, as Georges Fouron and Nina Glick Schiller (2002) have noted, both those who go and those who stay are involved in and affected by transnational migration.

Said, a 59 years old Copt, comes from Alexandria from a middle/upper class family. He belongs to the “first generation”, as he migrated to Milan in the 1970s.

“no, I don’t want to return. Never. I don’t even go to Egypt on vacation because my children want to go to Barcelona. I can’t oblige my son. My father died four years ago, my brothers and sisters…they don’t bother”26.

However, many “first generation” Egyptians still visit the country of origin and see their old age as a “commuter’s return” (Schellenbaum 1998/1999: 259): alongside a moderate investment in Egypt, they spend there some months a year, often summer, and reject the idea of moving to Egypt permanently due to its political and economic instability and to the bad quality of its welfare. “Home is the place where I live in safety”27: ‘aman (safety) is an often-quoted word when talking about “home”. As shown by Leonardo Schiocchet (2019), istiqār identifies steadiness (stability) and settlement for Arabic-speaking refugees in Austria. Similarly, Egyptians in Milan define watān (nation) on the theoretical level as a stable place where you can settle. Egypt is perceived as a much beloved country but bankrupt (mufilisa) where you cannot invest (mish hastathmir).

The “second generation”, on the other side, is consistently investing, buying houses or assets for their families. Ibrahim is forty-two years old, comes from the Delta area, and immigrated to Italy in 2001. He bought a taxi for his brother, in Egypt, and states clearly that he would like to return. For recently immigrated Egyptians, in fact, ideas of homeland and wellbeing at an old age often intertwine with a feeling of nostalgia of the past, which materialises in an idealized return. They tend to consider their place of origin as reassuring and unchanged by time. Mona, who arrived in Milan in 2008, told us: “I came with an agreement: in six months, if I don’t like it, the country, I’ll come back”28. She never did, but still keeps strong ties with her family of origin, which, for their part, the “first generation” Egyptians have gradually lost. Mohamed, recently immigrated to Italy: “my homeland (waṭanī) you are the warm embrace where I smell my mother’s scent and feel my father’s safety”29.

Even if Coptic Egyptian migrants’ answers are in line with Muslims’ ones: “my country (baladī) is Egypt, my home (baytī) is my family’s place, my land (ʿarḍī) is in my country, my homeland (watānī) is where I belong”30, Copts hold different stances vis à vis the idea of returning. For Copts, returning is never an option, since they would feel threatened and discriminated against by a largely Muslim

23 Mohammed Asfa, imam at the mosque in via Padova (April 2019).
24 Mohammed Morsi (1951-2019) was the fifth Egyptian President (2012-2013) and was removed from his office by current President General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (2013, -) after some protests sparked across the country. He was affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization.
25 Mohammed Asfa, imam at the mosque in via Padova (April 2019).
26 Said, male, Copt (February 2020).
27 Doha, female, Muslim (May 2021).
28 Mona, 47 years old, female, Muslim (December 2019).
29 Mustafa, male, Muslim (June 2021).
30 Nadia, female, Copt (May 2021).
society.  

“I don’t go back because I am Italian and I am a Copt. Both. Being a Copt today is difficult. We Copts are infidels for Muslims. They are killing each other. When there is a church, Muslims have to build their mosque soon. You don’t know how long you have to wait to get the permission to build a church. Now they passed a law, but just now. Last two years they passed a law to build new churches, but before? There are many churches but compare them with the number of Christians there, I don’t know. Then in Cairo it’s another thing, but go to the countryside…I did not invest in Egypt, no.”

The Copts’ right to their own religion is experienced as central, and many fear even physical persecutions if they go back to Egypt. First generation Egyptians came to Italy with the idea of finding an open, multi-religious society, or at least a safe haven for Christians.

“At the beginning, when I arrived here, nobody asked what religion we belonged to. We were the first. Gradually the Coptic Church has grown and the Patriarch [sic]. There’s Senato street the first and then Teocrito street and Melchiorre Gioia street there are many...We are not in touch with the Copts’ community, for us the Church is [to] go there on Sunday go to the mass and come back. We don’t have any help, nor a community talking to each other, when there are problems. We don’t have time!”

Said here refers to the closure of his pizzeria due to the national lockdown in Spring, 2020, when he felt “abandoned,” both by the state and by its Egyptian/Coptic community. Along ethnicity and religion, another important factor in the definition of future plans and strategies of aging “well” is gender, which often interrelates with religion. Saida immigrated in 1974 with her husband, who is going to be retired in six months. When she had her first daughter, she moved back to Egypt and stayed there for fifteen years. At that time, her husband, Morgan, was working in Milan and sending remittances to support her wife and daughter. The reason of her stay in Egypt was that she did not want her daughter to grow up in Italy. “We are Muslims, and here it is another life as all her friends were Italians. Going out once it is ok I allow her but the second time no. Girls and boys together I did not like it.” The trend of raising children in Egypt is more pronounced for recent immigrants, who enrol their offspring in Muslim schools, the madrassas, adhering to the new Islamic revival trend in Egypt (see, among others, Mahmood 2005).
patriarchal organization of the society. Studying gender relations regarding care at the time of SARS-CoV-2 among migrants can help us shed light on how the actors perform in the household, and how the house and its space configure and shape kin and gender relations. Moreover, care and care labor can illuminate key aspects of political belonging, as Tatjana Thelen and Cati Coe (2017) have shown in the case of elderly care. Echoing Miriam Ines Ticktin (2011)'s words, migrants are key ethnographic sites to analyse what “politics” means in our world, because it is there that borders lie, and political action is shaped (6). Immigrants are today's proletarians (Balibar 2004: 50), and thus offer privileged sites to inquire into economic and social issues and their transformations.

In 2020, the care burden for Egyptian women significantly increased, due to the necessity of keeping elders safe, due to homeschooling, and to unprecedented layoffs targeting many Egyptian men. In general, the Egyptian community has shown high contagion and high unemployment rates. The catering and food sector, in fact, was undoubtedly one of the most hit by the prolonged and intermittent lockdowns, as it lost 38 billion euros in 2020, leading many restaurants to close down permanently. The shutdowns and closures impacted particularly harshly on the Egyptian community, as many of its members were employed as restaurant workers.

“My husband lost his job. He was working as a pizzaiolo in this restaurant. They are still open, they deliver, but the work is less and they decided to leave someone at home. My husband worked on call and he remained at home. We don’t know how to survive, I don’t work. My brother is also here from Egypt. In Egypt he was a vet, he wanted to apply for the equivalence of his title here but offices don’t work now, everything is stopped”.

Egyptian women have low employment rates and were therefore less hit, in this respect, by the crisis.

“At the beginning it was...them [men], those who came here first were them. Anyway, I came here for family reunification [purposes], with my husband. I am part of those women who are housewives because they followed [their] husbands. You don’t find lots of workers [among women] they are few anyway”.

At the same time, many Egyptian women found themselves in extremely critical economic conditions due to the layoff of their husbands. Moreover, many Egyptian women had to deal with the death of their spouses due to SARS-CoV-2.

“My husband died in May, he was seventy-two but still worked with my elder son, they had an import/export company of agricultural machines. Without him, everything is stopped. The other son works as electrician and brings home some money, but it is never enough. I struggle to hide the economic situation from my sons, because one is going to university, and I don’t want him to drop out. We receive food aid from the mosque, we don’t buy anything, but still there are rent and bills. I am very afraid of getting evicted”.

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39 Kimberlé Crenshaw speaking at the webinar Under the Blacklight. The Intersectional Failures that COVID Lays Bare, March 2020, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsBstnmBtAI.
40 On May 8 2020, the Istituto Superiore di Sanità (ISS) published a study on the contagion rates among migrants in Italy: 1.8 per thousand Egyptians was infected: https://www.ismu.org/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-migrants-in-italy-local-contagion-and-global-health/.
42 Mariam, female, Muslim (June 2020).
43 Ramadan, male, Muslim (March 2020).
44 Mona, 47 years old, female, Muslim (December 2019).
45 Raudha, female, Muslim (June 2021).
In this case, Raudha found herself in a lower social class.

“I used to work as linguistic and cultural mediator in schools, but now schools are closed. In addition, my husband used to drive me, I don’t have a driving license. No money to register in a driving school now. I started looking for jobs, all I found were jobs as a cleaning lady and I have serious health issues, I can’t bend for long hours. I wanted a job in an office, a call center, something like that. I experienced racism. I test the hirers: when they don’t want Arabs, they don’t even answer when you talk to them. They turn their faces. I became the family man, and I don’t know what to do” 46.

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has changed gender relations regarding unpaid work at home. Non-wage or unpaid domestic labor as “raising children, cooking, cleaning [...], caring for elderly relatives, shopping, household management, as well as mental tasks such as planning schedules and performing emotional labor such as tending family relationships” (Power 2020: 67) is closely related to processes of aging. For Egyptian women in Milan, in fact, much of the workload at home consists in taking care of the elderly members of the household, and, inevitably, the pandemic has increased it.

“I started to go to the market myself, because my mother is too old...too at risk. I decided to isolate her and ask my younger son to bring her medicines. My son was doing school homework at home, so I was helping him, leaving him alone with his pc, waking him up, preparing him lunch so he could study” 47.

The SARS-CoV-2 crisis has significantly reshaped the possibilities of socializing among Egyptian women, who used to attend the weekly market and school lessons with fellow country women. Everyday life has inevitably changed: “I used to go the market, to the hairdresser. Now, I don’t go to my friends’ house any longer” 49.

“Egyptian women used to perform all the tasks which are connected to homemaking, but some of them were consistently helped by their family of origin.

“My parents are here, they are old. They also help me with the maintenance of the house, but, after COVID, I had to take care. I don’t work. I was doing a course in Rozzano, before, but now I can’t do anything. I graduated in chemistry in Egypt, I was working in a lab. In Italy, I learned Italian and took the middle school certificate together with my son. I am a person who can’t stay still, never. Now I am staying at home, the whole day” 48.

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The daily care practices have to incorporate and manage the risk of transmitting the disease. The way in which the concept of “risk”, referring to the possibility of getting infected by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, is understood is influenced by wider cultural and social frames. Risk management strategies in the Egyptian community are deeply embedded in processes of making sense of ideas such as pollution and dirt and are linked to Islamic notions of “fate”. Risk is therefore contextually invoked together with destiny.

“You don’t have to have guilt feelings if you infect someone in the family, because the disease is something from God. If God gives us a disease, he gives us the cure as well. He wants something from us. What can I do? Me, myself? Nothing. We have the duty to try to survive. But if we don’t, we did enough” 50.

“We can’t fight against the disease, we can’t do otherwise. I am not afraid, I am indifferent. I am not courageous, but if the infection arrives, I can’t run away” 51.

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46 Raudha, female, Muslim (June 2021).
47 Abir, 35 years old, female, Muslim (May 2020).
48 Hala, female, Muslim (May 2020).
49 Abir 35 years old, female, Muslim (May 2020).
50 Abir 35 years old, female, Muslim (May 2020).
The pandemic, with an increase in people’s permanence at home, has laid bare the importance of homemaking routine actions in the perpetration of households and the protection of its inhabitants. Routinized actions, as well as the following of certain temporal schemes, are central to the processes of homemaking. Scholarly literature on homeless people, for example, goes beyond the idea of homes as spaces or places and defines them as processes, that is the result of certain habits, objects, and rhythms (Veness 1993).

“I go to the supermarket, to the pharmacy to protect my husband who is older. My sons are afraid, too. At his age he underwent a heart surgery. They banned strangers in the house. I used to prepare packets [for charity] at home but my sons said no, they are afraid for their father”52.

Social scientists have recently called for a rereading of Mary Douglas’ work to frame the responses to the pandemic (Brown 2020). In her Risk and Culture. An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Danger (1982), Douglas frames risk as inherently political and moral. The pandemic affected political imaginaries regarding old people and their treatment: being the most at risk of dying, older people became somehow “expendable” in political discourses. The UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, for example, called for “herd immunity”, implying that death is an unavoidable element of the pandemic, especially for older adults, unveiling a neo-liberal logic of governance (Brown 2020: 5). For Egyptian women in Milan, age has become one of the main bases for categorizing risk.

“My parents are too old, what can we do. If something happens, I don’t trust hospitals, many get COVID there. We keep them home, they are less at risk”53.

Homemaking actions are also functional to the containment of the virus. SARS-CoV-2 has triggered a shift in what Mary Douglas (1966[1976]) calls the “symbolic systems of purity”. The behaviour we follow regarding pollution is based on a negative reaction towards any object or idea which can confuse or contradict the classifications we are used to, such as, for example, putting shoes on a table. The risk of contagion is understood by the actors as the possibility of a body – historically and culturally constructed as “pure” – being infected by the “outside”, which is only superficially described as “dirty”, but is in reality what is perceived “out of place.” In a very similar way, Egyptian women in Milan see risk as inherent in dirt, which is incompatible with order, but also believe that individuals can dominate danger through ritual practices.

“Since February 23 to today I went out five times. Also the others. The only one who goes out more often is my son who works. He’s a custodian in a delivery company. He goes Thursday evening and comes back on Saturday morning. He wears mask, gloves, carries always hand sanitizer, when he comes back, in front of the door he takes off his shoes, he puts them in a bag, takes off his clothes and puts them in another bag, goes to the washing machine and enters the shower immediately. He’s the only one who goes out. Everyday I clean my house, I clean everything, I try to throw unnecessary things away, wash my hands, I do my duty. I do it, I am calm. If the disease arrives, what can I do? Nothing. It’s not being wise, I want to find a way to calm me and others down. A little black pepper on food, it helps”54.

Keeping things “clean”, that is “uncontaminated”, increases the workload at home, together with keeping an eye on children, either pre- or school aged.

“Children are always crying because they are at home and don’t go out, kindergarten children”55.

Not to be underestimated is, also, the additional workload because of husbands who find themselves at home for longer hours in comparison to pre-pandemic times.

“Husbands are at home and are often scared of infections and force family members not to go out. They are afraid of

52 Layla, female, Muslim. Her husband died of COVID in November, 2020 (March 2020).
53 Nadia, female, Muslim (May 2021).
54 Layla, female, Muslim. Her husband died of COVID in November, 2020 (March 2020).
55 Hanan, female, Muslim (July 2020).
going to hospitals. They are afraid of going to the market, “if we get sick, who is going to work?.” My husband doesn’t work, he is always stepping over my slippers [getting in my way while I do housework]”56.

However, the pandemic has also balanced gender relations. More Egyptian men engage in housework and childcare, sometimes for the first time in their life. This calls for further scrutiny and should be analysed diachronically over the pandemic years and in the near future.

“He is at home, I go out to buy stuff, go to the market, prepare packets [for charity]. I told him “prepare stuff for lunch”. He has always been passionate about cooking, I mean, it is his job. He made lunch for his kids, for the first time”57.

CARE AND VOLUNTEERING AT THE TIME OF SARS-COV-2 IN ITALY: GIOVANI PER IL BENE

As Tatjana Thelen has influentially shown in Sorge/Care (2014), accelerated social transformations can be privileged moments to inquire into the adoption and management of care practices, as well as the temporal, institutional, demographic, and gender-specific aspects of care. Anthropological literature has highlighted how the notion of care can imply ambivalent meanings (for an overview, see Diodati 2021). The Egyptian community’s care practices during the pandemic embodied this ambivalence: on the one side, care in the private sphere increased with specific gendered implications, while, on the other, it shifted out of the domestic sphere in the form of migrants’ charity associations. Egyptian women’s charity work took place mainly at home, contributing to the “second shift” (Hochschild 1989) experienced during the pandemic.

Nadje Al-Ali has pointed out how the Iraqi diaspora in Germany never got involved in politics but became active in humanitarian work (2017: X); similarly, Egyptians, some of whom fled political persecution and some estranged themselves from social and political involvement in Egypt, became very active within the diaspora and the Italian civil society. As soon as the pandemic broke out, some Egyptians living near the first locked down area (Soresina, where the first SARS-CoV-2 cluster was isolated) published a Facebook page58 to share videos to explain the safety measures in Arabic. They were soon contacted by Egyptian migrants who wanted to donate face masks, food, and medicines, which were then distributed to hospitals and families in need. Progressively, on the one side, they started receiving donations from Italian citizens and other foreign nationals, and, on the other side, they organized care-recipients’ lists through Whatsapp, reaching people as far south as Sicily. Giovani per il bene, the name of the Facebook page, became a capillary reality and attracted the attention of the media59. Egyptian women in Milan and Lombardy participated actively, shopping for goods at the market and storing them in warehouses which were donated by some Egyptian entrepreneurs.

Usual homemaking processes such as shopping, cooking, administrative tasks, ritualized actions and activities, have been layered to the preparation of packets, meals, to the exertion of daily actions such as making phone calls, organizing deliveries. They showed various levels of engagement, which can be linked to prescribed alms giving in Islam, the zakat, and to the desire to be part of the Italian imagined community, giving back what Italy has given to them. Their work recalls the concept of Andrea Muehlenbach’s (2012: 8) “ethical citizenship”, as a kind of relation between citizens and the state which is based on care for others and has had a long tradition in Lombardy as a substitute for a perceived absent state. Moving care from women’s moral and private sphere, the charity association has located it in an ethic which inhabits the public realm.

As Costanzo Ranci (2001) has knowingly described, the Italian third sector may appear relatively small, if compared to other European countries, because the level of informal participation in volunteering activities and charity associations is difficult to grasp (Ranci 2001: 75). In reality, no other Euro-

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56 Doha, female, Muslim (May 2021).
57 Khaula, female, Muslim (June 2021).
pean country relies on volunteering activities like Italy, where “one quarter of all non-profit organizations in the country [...] [relies] exclusively on volunteers” (Ranci 2001: 76) and Italy is the only country in Europe which grants tax relief and subsidies to voluntary associations (Ranci 2001: 76). In the general climate of the “outsourcing” or “externalizing” solidarity from state structures to private citizens (Muehlenbach 2012: 12), migrants’ charity associations have also rapidly increased60. During the pandemic in Italy, since care practices within households operate according to a different logic than capitalism or wage labor (Gibson-Graham 2006), they served as a safety net for individuals who have lost work or have always been excluded from capitalism-dominated exchanges. Giovani per il bene was born as a “mutual aid association”, that is a self-organized reality targeting migrants as an “ethnic network”, but, as stated by its members, it was open from the beginning to everybody: “we help the Human Being, not Muslims, not Christians”61. Progressively, it became a humanitarian association giving essential aid (food, medicines) to all those who need it, regardless of their background. By humanitarianism here we mean a form of care, or, to quote Miriam Ines Ticktin, a “regime of care”, “a set of regulated discourses and practices grounded on [...] [the] moral imperative to relieve suffering” (Ticktin 2011: 3). In her ethnography on the humanitarian discourse on immigration in France, she argues that such regimes of care do not challenge the established order (Ticktin 2011: 20). Similarly, humanitarian associations which were established in Italy during the pandemic, whose main aim was to slap a band aid on an emergency situation, do not tackle the structural inequalities and the retrenchment of the state from the public health sector, identified as one of the reasons behind Lombardy’s high death rate (Navarro 2020: 273-274). For long considered to be in an opposition, the private and public spheres are thought to be carrying different gendered meanings.

As a feminine space, the household and the home-making activities are often invisible to an external eye and connected to the informal economy. The charity association brought to the fore women’s unpaid work moving it outside their household and creating or strengthening a network between them.

“We cooperate, we started we were five/six, we delivered to 150 families at the beginning. We collect money among us, the Egyptian... Arab community, and we buy food. At the beginning of Ramadan we delivered food for Ramadan. A husband, one of our husbands, goes to all of us and collects meals, the woman has cooked for ten people, and brings everything to a school in Rozzano”62.

Egyptian women began being recognized as political agents.

“I want to give back what I received from this country, because it is the country of my children. As long as I was at home, nobody in my son’s school knew me. Now I deliver to some of his classmates, and he is proud”63.

Social and economic inequality, which was only visible in the intimacies of family life, came to the fore along with the efforts of families to survive and sustain themselves.

“A friend of a friend, her husband got SARS-CoV-2, he is in hospital. We went there to give her prepared food, we didn’t know they had so many problems”64.

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61 Ibrahim, male, Muslim (May 2020).
62 Hala, female, Muslim (May 2020).
63 Zohra, female, Muslim (May 2020).
64 Nissaf, female, Muslim (May 2020).
THE SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING INDEX

The research group has developed a quantitative tool to assess the wellbeing of the three diasporic communities analysed by TAAD: the Egyptian, the Eritrean, and the Senegalese. Starting from the transcription of ten qualitative interviews per community, together with a group of psychologists at the University of Milano-Bicocca, the TAAD research group has developed a survey inquiring five domains: individual, emotional/psychological, economic, social, and spiritual wellbeing. The survey included 160 Egyptian migrants of different genders, ages, professions, and educational levels. The instrument has been statistically validated throughout EFA (Exploratory Factor Analysis) and demonstrated robust psychometric properties in all its factors (see Table 1). Discussing with experts and reaching a wide consensus, after being validated, the EFA has been carried out through orthogonal varimax with Kaiser normalization. Factor 1 refers to the dimension of general satisfaction with one’s life and with the perception of the future, Factor 2 to the psychological domain and Factor 3 to the economic wellbeing of the subjects. Lastly, Factor 4 concerns the social life of the interviewed and Factor 5 the spiritual wellbeing, also connected to the religious sphere. Table 2 shows the Repeated Measures ANOVA analysis and the Pearson Correlation analysis which have been carried out starting from the collected data:

the results of the Subjective Wellbeing Index show how the individual wellbeing is lower for Egyptian women than for men, while the emotional/psychological wellbeing reaches higher values for women. Moreover, more educated participants showed greater levels of spiritual well-being.

CONCLUSION

The Egyptian community in Milan, rather than being homogenous, consists in globally mobile categories of identification, and is cross-cut by internal diverging lines such as period of immigration, religion, gender, and socio-economic levels. This internal differentiation reflects itself in the trajectories that Egyptian migrants follow once they age, molding different long-term plans, for example return. Inequalities, especially regarding the possession of the legal permit to stay in the country, impact on the wellbeing of migrants at an old age, who find themselves unable to access social security and the health system. The situation was exacerbated by the 2020 pandemic and by the consequent measures of containment of the virus, who pushed vulnerable subjects further to the margins of society. Aging among Egyptian migrants soon became a way of categorizing risk and a vector of increased vulnerability. At the same time, integrating a depowered social and health system which has been suffering from neoliberal cuts, charity activities emerged among the Egyptian community, providing support to those in need, regardless of their nationality and faith. They intertwined Islamic sentiment of alimony with some work-related assets, such as stores and trucks, and with the care labor of Egyptian women. Shifting care practices to a public “outside”, traditionally considered to be a masculine realm, has in fact highlighted the political agency of Egyptian female migrants, who usually hold low level of employment and civil engagement. From the TAAD quantitative analysis results, Egyptian women show low level of individual wellbeing, probably connected to the professional sphere, and higher levels of emotional and psychological wellbeing than men. In general, Egyptian migrants have become protagonists in experimenting an alternative system of welfare, and gendered and ethnicized forms of care are integral elements to these experiments and deserve renewed attention in times of emergency and crisis.
### Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Items of the Subjective Wellbeing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor1</th>
<th>Factor2</th>
<th>Factor3</th>
<th>Factor4</th>
<th>Factor5</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I like the things I do</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>individual wellbeing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I generally feel that I can do daily the things I would like to do</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My health situation allows me to do the things I would like to do</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel full of energy</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can reach autonomously the places where I want to go</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sleep well</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel my life is meaningful</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel I am in control over my life</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I look at the future, I see positive things</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I look at the past, I feel happiness</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to my economic condition, I have to renounce to some things</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I walk down the street, I feel like a foreigner</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, I feel lonely</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to the COVID pandemics, I am worried about my health situation</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the COVID outbreak, I feel more lonely</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the quarantine, I reduced sensibly the number of contacts I have with other people</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think COVID affected negatively my economic and professional condition</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the quarantine, I modified sensibly my habits</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel that restrictions of movement towards my homecountry is a bad thing</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am satisfied with my current economic situation</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.0693</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My economic situation allows me to do what I want</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, I feel calm about my economic condition</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I need something, I know whom to ask to</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many people I can count on (friends, relatives, people from my community)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am happy when I am with other people</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I need anything, there are people who can help me</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe God cares about my problems</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The relation to God makes me feel good</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find peace through praying</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that the response given by the institutions to the emergency was good</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction method: principal factors; rotation method: orthogonal varimax with Kaiser normalization; loading larger than .45 are in bold
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>F1  individual wellbeing</th>
<th>F2 emotional/psychological wellbeing</th>
<th>F3 economic wellbeing</th>
<th>F4 social wellbeing</th>
<th>F5 spiritual wellbeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>score</td>
<td>F-Value</td>
<td>Prob &gt; F</td>
<td>score</td>
<td>F-Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>0.0072**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female / Male</td>
<td>-0.435**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.475**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.1531</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.6415</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p < .05, ** = p < .01.


